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Quantifying over boolean announcements
Hans van Ditmarsch∗, Tim French†
Abstract
Various extensions of public announcement logic have been proposed with quan-
tification over announcements. The best-known extension is called arbitrary public
announcement logic, APAL. It contains a primitive language construct ✷ϕ intu-
itively expressing that “after every public announcement of a formula, formula ϕ is
true.” The logic APAL is undecidable and it has an infinitary axiomatization. Now
consider restricting the APAL quantification to public announcements of boolean
formulas only, such that ✷ϕ intuitively expresses that “after every public announce-
ment of a boolean formula, formula ϕ is true.” This logic can therefore called boolean
arbitrary public announcement logic, BAPAL. The logic BAPAL is the subject of
this work. It is decidable and it has a finitary axiomatization. These results may
be considered of interest, as for various applications quantification over booleans is
sufficient in formal specifications.
1 Introduction
Public announcement logic (PAL) [15, 19] extends epistemic logic with operators for rea-
soning about the effects of specific public announcements. The formula [ψ]ϕ means that
“ϕ is true after the truthful announcement of ψ.” This means that, when interpreted in
a Kripke model with designated state, after submodel restriction to the states where ϕ
is true (this includes the designated state, ‘truthful’ here means true), ψ is true in that
restriction. Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) [4] augments this with operators
for quantifying over public announcements. The formula ✷ϕ means that “ϕ is true after
the truthful announcement of any formula that does not contain ✷.”
Quantifying over the communication of information as in APAL has applications to
epistemic protocol synthesis, where we wish to achieve epistemic goals by communicating
information to agents, but where we do not know of a specific protocol that will achieve
the goal, and where we may not even know if such a protocol exists. In principle, syn-
thesis problems can be solved by specifying them as formulas in the logic, and applying
model-checking or satisfiability procedures. However in the case of APAL, while there is a
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PSPACE-complete model-checking procedure [1], the satisfiability problem is undecidable
in the presence of multiple agents [13].
The quest for a decidable version of public announcement logic with quantification has
been going on for a while. Group announcement logic and coalition announcement logic,
that are logics with quantifiers over public information change that are similar to APAL, are
also undecidable [2]. Whereas the ‘mental model’ arbitrary public announcement logic of
[10] is decidable. Yet other dynamic epistemic logics have more generalized quantification,
namely over non-public information change. Of those, arbitrary arrow update logic [25] is
undecidable, whereas refinement modal logic [8] and arbitrary action model logic [16] are
decidable. The above-mentioned [10], wherein a decidable arbitrary public announcement
logic is presented, is an interesting case. Decidability is achieved by restricting epistemic
modalities, while retaining arbitrary announcements (of formulas containing such modali-
ties). These special modalities are not labelled with an (abstract set of) agents, but with
programs using propositional variables. This severely constrains the relational (‘Kripke’)
models (possibly) satisfying the formulas bound by the epistemic modalities, which is how
decidability can then be obtained for this logic. Instead, in the logic that we will pro-
pose, we do not restrict the epistemic modalities, but restrict the quantification over the
announcements, the dynamic modalities.
We propose a multi-agent epistemic logic with public announcements and with quantifi-
cation over public announcements of boolean formulas (so-called boolean announcements).1
We call this boolean arbitrary public announcement logic (BAPAL). It is therefore a ver-
sion of APAL: as said, in APAL we allow quantification over any quantifier-free (✷-free)
formulas, including formulas with announcement modalities and knowledge modalities.
Unlike APAL, BAPAL is decidable.
For APAL only an infinitary axiomatization is known [5], although it has not been proved
that a finitary axiomatization cannot exist [17].2 This
Unlike APAL, BAPAL has a (complete) finitary axiomatization.
We also show that BAPAL is more expressive than public announcement logic.
There seem to be many applications, in particular in planning, wherein it makes sense
only to consider quantifications over booleans.
1It is more common to write Boolean with a capital letter B, after the mathematician Boole, than to
write boolean with a lower case b. We prefer the latter: at some stage, names become kinds.
2 Only an infinitary axiomatization was known: recently, a finitary axiomatization for a logic much
like APAL was proposed in [6]. Its structures are topological and its semantics allows to refer to states
prior to an announcement (it is history-based). As non-bisimilar states can become bisimilar after an
announcement, this semantics makes it possible to continue to distinguish such states; which is the basis
for the soundness of their complete axiomatization. Their ✷ quantifies over epistemic formulas, which in
their setting is different from quantifying over formulas that may also contain announcements (the ✷-free
formulas). The semantics is therefore different from that of APAL and also different from that of BAPAL,
with quantification over booleans. It is an open question if the logic of [6] is different from APAL, i.e., if
the logics have the same sets of validities/theorems.
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Consider cards cryptography wherein two communicating agents (the principals) at-
tempt to learn the card deal without other players (eavesdroppers) learning the card deal,
or even something stronger, such as not learning the ownership of any single card other
than their own [12, 20, 11]. When modelling initial uncertainty about a stack of cards being
dealt over a finite set of players, single states in such models can be uniquely identified
with a card deal. Therefore, public announcements restricting such models correspond to
booleans. For example, let there be three cards 0, 1, 2 and three players Alice, Bob, and
Eve, and suppose that Alice announces (truthfully) that she holds card 0. This corre-
sponds to the public announcement of (some elementary boolean representation of) two
card deals, namely the one wherein, additionally, Bob holds 1 and Eve holds 2, and the
one wherein Bob holds 2 and Eve holds 1.
As another example, consider multi-agent planning for publicly observable sensing ac-
tions under uncertainty [18, 22, 7, 9]: given multiple agents that are uncertain about a
number of system parameters (lights, switches, temperature settings) they may be in-
formed, or they may be informing each other, about their observations of the state of the
light. Or they may be planning to make such observations, and contingent on the outcome
of such observations take further action.
We close the introduction with an outline of the content of this work. In Section 2 we
define the logical language and semantics of BAPAL and we give various semantic results
that will be used in later sections. Section 3 is on the expressivity of BAPAL, and Section 4
presents the complete axiomatization. Finally, Section 5 proves the decidability of BAPAL.
2 Boolean arbitrary public announcement logic
Given are a countable (finite or countably infinite) set of agents A and a countably infinite
set of propositional variables P (a.k.a. atoms, or variables).
2.1 Syntax
We start with defining the logical language and some crucial syntactic notions.
Definition 1 (Language) The language of boolean arbitrary public announcement logic
is defined as follows, where a ∈ A and p ∈ P .
Lbapal (A, P ) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | ✷ϕ ⊣
Other propositional connectives are defined by abbreviation. For Kaϕ read ‘agent a knows
ϕ’. For ✷ϕ, read ‘after any (boolean) announcement, ϕ (is true)’. For [ϕ]ψ, read ‘after
public announcement of ϕ, ψ’. The dual modalities are defined by abbreviation: Kˆaϕ :=
¬Ka¬ϕ, 〈ϕ〉ψ := ¬[ϕ]¬ψ, and ✸ϕ := ¬✷¬ϕ. Unless confusion results we often omit one
or both of the parameters A and P in Lbapal (A, P ), and write Lbapal (P ) or Lbapal . Formula
variables ϕ, ψ are possibly primed to denote other formula variables: ϕ′, ϕ′′, . . . , ψ′, . . .
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We also distinguish the language Lel of epistemic logic (without the constructs [ϕ]ϕ
and ✷ϕ) and the language Lpl of propositional logic (without additionally the construct
Kaϕ), also known as the booleans. Formula variables for booleans are ϕ0, ψ0, etc.
The set of propositional variables that occur in a given formula ϕ is denoted var(ϕ), its
modal depth d(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of Ka modalities, and its quantifier depth D(ϕ)
is the maximum nesting of ✷ modalities. These all have obvious inductive definitions.3 If
p /∈ var(ϕ) we say that p is a fresh atom.
Arbitrary announcement normal form is a syntactic restriction of Lbapal that pairs all
public announcements with arbitrary boolean announcement operators. It plays a role in
the decidability proof. We will show that any formula in Lbapal is equivalent to one in
Laanf .
Definition 2 (Arbitrary announcement normal form) The language fragment Laanf
is defined by the following syntax, where a ∈ A and p ∈ P .
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]✷ϕ
We now define necessity forms and possibility forms. Necessity forms are used in
derivation rules in the proof system.
Definition 3 (Necessity form) Consider a new symbol ♯. The necessity forms are de-
fined inductively as follows, where ϕ ∈ Lbapal and a ∈ A.
ψ(♯) ::= ♯ | (ϕ→ ψ(♯)) | Kaψ(♯) | [ϕ]ψ(♯)
A necessity form contains a unique occurrence of the symbol ♯. If ψ(♯) is a necessity form
and ϕ ∈ Lbapal , then ψ(ϕ) is ψ(♯)[ϕ/♯] (the substitution of ♯ in ψ(♯) by ϕ), where we note
that ψ(ϕ) ∈ Lbapal . A possibility form is the dual of a necessity form. They are therefore
defined as:
ψ{♯} ::= ♯ | (ϕ ∧ ψ{♯}) | Kˆaψ{♯} | 〈ϕ〉ψ{♯}
Similarly to above, notation ψ{ϕ} means that ♯ is substituted by ϕ in ψ{♯}.
Given possibility form ψ(♯), let ψ{♯} be obtained by replacing all → in ψ(♯) by ∧, all
Ka by Kˆa, and all [ϕ] by 〈ϕ〉. Note that ψ{♯} is indeed a possibility form. We will later
show that every ¬ψ(¬ϕ) is equivalent to ψ{ϕ}.
2.2 Structures
We consider the following structures and structural notions in this work.
3var (p) = {p}, var(¬ϕ) = var (Kaϕ) = var(✷ϕ) = var (ϕ), var (ϕ ∧ ψ) = var([ϕ]ψ) = var (ϕ) ∪ var(ψ);
D(p) = 0, D(¬ϕ) = D(Kaϕ) = D(ϕ), D(ϕ ∧ ψ) = D([ϕ]ψ) = max{D(ϕ), D(ψ)}, D(✷ϕ) = D(ϕ) + 1;
d(p) = 0, d(¬ϕ) = d(✷ϕ) = d(ϕ), d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = d([ϕ]ψ) = max{d(ϕ), d(ψ)}, d(Kaϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1.
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Definition 4 (Model) An (epistemic) model M = (S,∼, V ) consists of a domain S of
states (or ‘worlds’), an accessibility function ∼: A → P(S × S), where each ∼a is an
equivalence relation, and a valuation V : P → P(S), where each V (p) represents the set
of states where p is true. For s ∈ S, a pair (M, s), for which we write Ms, is an epistemic
state. ⊣
We will abuse the language and also call Ms a model.
Definition 5 (Bisimulation) Let M = (S,∼, V ) and M ′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) be epistemic
models. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′ is a bisimulation if and only if for every
(s, s′) ∈ R, p ∈ P , and a ∈ A the conditions atoms, forth and back hold.4
• atoms: s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p).
• forth: for every t ∼a s there exists t
′ ∼′a s
′ such that (t, t′) ∈ R.
• back: for every t′ ∼′a s
′ there exists t ∼a s such that (t, t
′) ∈ R.
If there exists a bisimulation R between M and M ′ such that (s, s′) ∈ R, then Ms and M
′
s′
are bisimilar, notation Ms↔M
′
s′ (or R : Ms↔M
′
s′).
Let Q ⊆ P . A relation R between M and M ′ satisfying atoms for all p ∈ Q, and
forth and back, is a Q-bisimulation (a bisimulation restricted to Q). The notation for
Q-restricted bisimilarity is ↔Q. ⊣
Definition 6 (n-Bisimulation) Let n ∈ N. We define the notion of n-bisimulation R
between (pointed) epistemic models Ms,M
′
s′, notation R : Ms↔
nM ′s′, by natural induction
on n. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S×S ′ is a 0-bisimulation between Ms and M
′
s′, iff atoms
holds for pair (s, s′) ∈ R. Then, R is a (n + 1)-bisimulation between Ms and M
′
s′, iff for
all p ∈ P and a ∈ A:
• atoms: s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
• n-forth: For every t ∼a s there exists t
′ ∼′a s
′ such that R : Mt↔
nM ′t′ ;
• n-back: For every t′ ∼′a s
′ there exists t ∼a s such that R :Mt↔
nM ′t′.
Similary to Q-bisimulations we define Q-n-bisimulations, wherein atoms is only required
for p ∈ Q ⊆ P . ⊣
2.3 Semantics
We continue with the semantics of our logic.
4From here on we will write ‘iff’ for ‘if and only if’.
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Definition 7 (Semantics) The interpretation of formulas in L on epistemic models is
defined by induction on formulas.
Assume an epistemic model M = (S,∼, V ), and s ∈ S.
Ms |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
Ms |= ¬ϕ iff Ms 6|= ϕ
Ms |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Ms |= ϕ and Ms |= ψ
Ms |= Kaϕ iff for all t ∈ S : s ∼a t implies Mt |= ϕ
Ms |= [ϕ]ψ iff Ms |= ϕ implies M
ϕ
s |= ψ
Ms |= ✷ψ iff for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl : Ms |= [ϕ0]ψ
where [[ϕ]]M := {s ∈ S | Ms |= ϕ}; and where epistemic model M
ϕ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) is such
that: S ′ = [[ϕ]]M , ∼
′
a = ∼a ∩ ([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M ), and V
′(p) := V (p) ∩ [[ϕ]]M . For (M
ϕ)ψ we
may write Mϕψ. ⊣
Formula ϕ is valid, notation |= ϕ, if for all Ms, Ms |= ϕ. The logic (set of validities)
is called BAPAL. Given Ms and M
′
s′, if for all ϕ ∈ Lbapal , Ms |= ϕ iff M
′
s′ |= ϕ, we write
Ms ≡M
′
s′ . Similarly, if this holds for all ϕ with d(ϕ) ≤ n, we write Ms ≡
n M ′s′.
Just as for the logical language, we may occasionally write M(P ), Ms(P ), BAPAL(P ),
in order to be explicit about the parameter set of atoms P .
Note that the languages of APAL and BAPAL are the same, but that their semantics
are different. The only difference is the interpretation of ✷ϕ: in APAL, this quantifies over
the ✷-free fragment [4], so that, given the eliminability of public announcements from that
fragment [19], this amounts to quantifying over formulas of epistemic logic:.
Ms |= ✷ψ iff for all ϕ ∈ Lel : Ms |= [ϕ]ψ (APAL semantics of ✷ϕ)
2.4 Semantic results
We continue with basic semantic results for the logic. They will be used in various of the
later sections. Various well-known results for any dynamic epistemic logic with proposi-
tional quantification generalize straightforwardly to BAPAL. We start with the bisimula-
tion invariance of BAPAL. This is shown as for APAL.
Lemma 8 Let Ms, Ns′ be epistemic models. Then Ms↔Ns′ implies Ms ≡ Ns′. ⊣
Proof We prove that: for all ϕ ∈ Lbapal , and for all Ms, Ns′: if Ms↔Ns′, then Ms |= ϕ iff
Ns′ |= ϕ; from which the required follows by restricting the scope of ϕ to the consequent
of the implication. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ, where the ✷-depth
D(ϕ) takes lexicographic precedence over formula structure.5 The non-standard inductive
cases are [ϕ]ψ and ✷ψ (in either case we only show one direction of the equivalence in the
conclusion; the other direction is similar).
5ψ1 is less complex than ψ2, if D(ψ1) < D(ψ2), or if D(ψ1) = D(ψ2) and ψ1 is a subformula of ψ2.
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Case [ϕ]ψ:
This case is well-known from public announcement logic.
Let Ms↔Ns′ and Ms |= [ϕ]ψ. The latter is by definition equal to: Ms |= ϕ implies
Mϕs |= ψ.
Firstly, from Ms↔Ns′ and Ms |= ϕ, it follows by induction that Ns′ |= ϕ.
Secondly, this not only holds for s but for any t in the domain of M and t′ in the
domain of N : from Mt↔Nt′ and Mt |= ϕ, it follows by induction that Nt′ |= ϕ. We
emphasize that, given that ϕ is a subformula of [ϕ]ψ, the induction hypothesis applies to
any bisimilar model pair, not merely to Ms and Ns′.
This allows us to show that Mϕs ↔N
ϕ
s′ , namely by the relation R
′ :Mϕs ↔N
ϕ
s′ such that
for all t, t′: (t, t′) ∈ R′ iff ((t, t′) ∈ R and Mt |= ϕ). We now show that the relation R
′
is a bisimulation. The clause atoms is obvious. For forth, let s ∼a t in M
ϕ. Let t′ be
such that (t, t′) ∈ R and s′ ∼′a t
′. From (t, t′) ∈ R and Mt |= ϕ, we get with induction
that Mt′ |= ϕ. Therefore, (t, t
′) ∈ R′. As s′ ∼′a t
′ persists in Nϕ, the state t′ satisfies the
requirements for forth. The clause back is shown similar.
Thirdly, having shown that Mϕs ↔N
ϕ
s′ , we now use the induction hypothesis for ψ on
that model pair, and obtain that Nϕs′ |= ψ as required. Note that, similar to above, the
induction hypothesis for ψ applies to any bisimilar model pair, not merely to Ms and Ns′.
Winding up, we now have shown that (Ms |= ϕ implies M
ϕ
s |= ψ) is equivalent to
(Ns′ |= ϕ implies N
ϕ
s′ |= ψ), i.e., Ns′ |= [ϕ]ψ, as required.
Case ✷ψ:
Let Ms↔Ns′ and Ms |= ✷ψ. The latter is by definition equal to: for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl ,
Ms |= [ϕ0]ψ, i.e., for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , Ms |= ϕ0 implies M
ϕ0
s |= ψ. As D(ϕ0) < D(✷ψ) and
D(ψ) < D(✷ψ), by induction we obtain: for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , Ns′ |= ϕ0 implies N
ϕ0
s′ |= ψ,
i.e., Ns′ |= ✷ψ. (Note that the induction applies not merely to s but to any state t in N
satisfying ϕ0, needed to establish [[ϕ0]]M = [[ϕ0]]N .) 
Corollary 9 Let ϕ ∈ Lbapal such that Ms |= ϕ. Then Ms↔Ns′ implies M
ϕ
s
↔Nϕs′ . ⊣
The next lemma may look obvious but is actually rather special: it holds for BAPAL but
not, for example, for APAL, where the quantifiers are over formulas of arbitrarily large
modal depth. Lemma 10 plays a role in Section 3 on expressivity.
Lemma 10 Let two models Ms, Ns′ be given. If Ms↔
nNs′, then Ms ≡
n Ns′. ⊣
Proof We show the above by proving the following statement:
For all n ∈ N, for all ϕ ∈ Lbapal with d(ϕ) ≤ n, for all models Ms, Ns′: if
Ms↔
nNs′, then Ms |= ϕ iff Ns′ |= ϕ.
We prove this by refining the complexity measure used in the previous proposition: we
now, additionally, give modal depth d(ϕ) lexicographic precedence over quantifier depth
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D(ϕ).6 For clarity we give the —essentially different— case Kaϕ and also the —essentially
the same— cases [ϕ]ψ and ✷ψ. The latter two apply for any n ∈ N and do not require the
induction over n. We let these cases therefore precede the case Kaϕ.
Case [ϕ]ψ:
Given are Ms↔
nNs′ and Ms |= [ϕ]ψ. We note that d([ϕ]ψ) = max{d(ϕ), d(ψ)} so that
also d(ϕ), d(ψ) ≤ n. In this case of the proof we need to use induction on subformulas of
[ϕ]ψ. By definition, Ms |= [ϕ]ψ iff (Ms |= ϕ implies M
ϕ
s |= ψ).
In order to prove that Ns′ |= [ϕ]ψ, assume Ns′ |= ϕ. By induction, from Ms↔
nNs′
and Ns′ |= ϕ follows Ms |= ϕ. From that and the given Ms |= [ϕ]ψ follows that M
ϕ
s |= ψ.
Similar to the proof of this inductive case of Lemma 8, from Ms↔
nNs′ follows M
ϕ
s
↔nNϕs′ .
From that and Mϕs |= ψ follows N
ϕ
t′ |= ψ, as required.
Case ✷ψ: Let Ms↔
nNs′ and Ms |= ✷ψ. As d(ψ) = d(✷ψ), we will now use that
D(ψ) < D(✷ψ). This is therefore similar again to the same case in the previous Lemma
8. By definition, Ms |= ✷ψ is equal to: for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , Ms |= [ϕ0]ψ, i.e., for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl ,
Ms |= ϕ0 implies M
ϕ0
s |= ψ. It is now crucial to note that, as ϕ0 is boolean, not only
D(ϕ) = 0 but also d(ϕ0) = 0. We therefore obtain by induction, as in the previous case
[ϕ]ψ of this proof: for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , Ns′ |= ϕ0 implies N
ϕ0
s′ |= ψ, i.e., Ns′ |= ✷ψ.
Case Kaψ:
Given are Ms↔
n+1Ns′ and Ms |= Kaϕ. Let now t
′ ∼a s
′. From Ms↔
n+1Ns′, t
′ ∼a s
′,
and n − back follows that there is a t ∼a s such that Mt↔
nNt′ . From Ms |= Kaϕ and
s ∼a t follows that Mt |= ϕ. As d(ϕ) = d(Kaϕ) − 1 ≤ n, we can apply the induction
hypothesis for n and conclude that M ′t′ |= ϕ. As t
′ was arbitrary, Mt |= Kaϕ. 
The interest of the above proof is the precedence of modal depth over quantifier depth, and
of quantifier depth over subformula complexity. Essential in the proof is that in the case✷ψ,
for any [ϕ0]ψ witnessing that, not only D(ϕ0) = 0 but also d(ϕ0) = 0. Without d(ϕ0) = 0
the inductive hypothesis would not have applied. In contrast, the APAL quantifier is over
formulas of arbitrary finite modal depth, also exceeding the modal depth of the initial
given formula, which rules out use of induction.
As a matter of side interest we wish to observe that for both APAL and BAPAL
restricted bisimilarity does not preserve restricted modal equivalence, i.e., we do not have
that Ms↔QM
′
s′ implies Ms ≡Q M
′
s′ . The failure of this property is indirectly used in
Proposition 19 in the expressivity section, later, for Q = {p} (and for models with those
names).
Lemma 11 Every formula of Lbapal is semantically equivalent to a formula in arbitrary
announcement normal form. ⊣
6ψ1 is less complex than ψ2, if d(ψ1) < d(ψ2), or if d(ψ1) = d(ψ2) and D(ψ1) < D(ψ2), or if d(ψ1) =
d(ψ2) and D(ψ1) = D(ψ2) and ψ1 is a subformula of ψ2.
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Proof We give the proof by defining a truth preserving transformation δ from Lbapal to
Laanf . This is defined with the following recursion:
δ(p) = p δ(¬ψ) = ¬δ(ψ)
δ(ψ ∧ ψ′) = δ(ψ) ∧ δ(ψ′) δ(Kaψ) = Kaδ(ψ)
δ([ϕ]p) = δ(ϕ→ p) δ([ϕ]¬ψ) = δ(ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
δ([ϕ](ψ ∧ ψ′)) = δ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]ψ′) δ([ϕ]Kaψ) = δ(ϕ→ Ka[ϕ]ψ)
δ([ϕ][ϕ′]ψ) = δ([ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ′]ψ) δ([ϕ]✷ψ) = [δ(ϕ)]✷δ(ψ)
δ(✷ψ) = [⊤]✷δ(ψ)
All these equivalences are semantically valid. The equivalences [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ → ¬[ϕ]ψ),
[ϕ](ψ∧ψ′)↔ ([ϕ]ψ∧[ϕ]ψ′), [ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ka[ϕ]ψ), and [ϕ][ϕ
′]ψ ↔ [ϕ∧[ϕ]ϕ′]ψ are well-
known from works on public announcement logic [19, 24]. We further note that according
to the usual measures in public announcement logic [24, 5] in all but one translation clause
the complexity of the right-hand side of each equivalence is either equal to or lower than the
complexity of the left-hand side of the equivalence. In particular [ϕ][ϕ′]ψ is more complex
than [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ′]ψ in such measures. The exception is that, of course, δ(✷ψ) is less, not
more, complex than [⊤]✷δ(ψ). But this does not adversely affect termination. Therefore,
δ will always return a formula in Laanf . 
Lemma 12 Given are necessity form ψ(♯), possibility form ψ{♯}, and ϕ ∈ Lbapal . Then
¬ψ(ϕ) is equivalent to ψ{¬ϕ}. ⊣
Proof This is easily shown by induction on the structure of necessity forms and using that
¬(ϕ→ ψ(♯)) iff ϕ∧¬ψ(♯), that ¬Kaψ(♯) iff Kˆa¬ψ(♯), and that ¬[ϕ]ψ(♯) iff 〈ϕ〉¬ψ(♯). 
A number of obvious BAPAL validities is as follows.
Proposition 13
• |= ✷ϕ→ ✷✷ϕ (4)
• |= ✷✸ϕ→ ✸✷ϕ (MK)
• |= ✸✷ϕ→ ✷✸ϕ (CR) ⊣
Proof
• The dual validity✸✸ϕ→ ✸ϕ follows from the simple observation that for all ϕ0, ψ0 ∈
Lpl and for all M : M
ϕ0ψ0 =Mϕ0∧ψ0 .7
7So, this is a more direct proof than in [4], where it is used that Mϕψ is bisimilar to Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ. For
ϕ, ψ 6∈ Lpl , Mϕψ is typically not bisimilar to Mϕ∧ψ.
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• MK is shown in the usual way. Assume that Ms |= ✷✸ϕ. Given the set var(ϕ) of
propositional variables occurring in ϕ, let δs(ϕ) be the characteristic function for the
valuation of var(ϕ) in state s. We then have Ms |= [δs(ϕ)]✸ϕ, and M
δs(ϕ)
s |= ✸ϕ. In
the model M
δs(ϕ)
s the valuation of the propositional variables in var(ϕ) is constant
in the domain (for each such p ∈ var(ϕ), either V (p) = D(M δs(ϕ)) or V (p) = ∅).
Therefore, M
δs(ϕ)
s is var(ϕ)-bisimilar to a singleton model (with reflexive access for
all agents) with the same valuation. We now use that restricted bisimilarity to a
singleton model implies modal equivalence in the restricted language.8 This can now
be proved as in Lemma 8, without the ✷ϕ inductive case failing. On singleton models,
✸ϕ↔ ϕ and ✷ϕ ↔ ϕ are valid. From that and the observed modal equivalence we
get that from M
δs(ϕ)
s |= ✸ϕ follows M
δs(ϕ)
s |= ✷ϕ. Thus Ms |= 〈δs(ϕ)〉✷ϕ, and
Ms |= ✸✷ϕ.
• In order to prove CR we have to show that: for all ϕ0, ψ0 ∈ Lpl and for all M ,
there are ϕ′0, ψ
′
0 ∈ Lpl such that M
ϕ0ϕ
′
0↔Mψ0ψ
′
0 . The obvious choice is ϕ′0 = ψ0 and
ψ′0 = ϕ0, as
Mϕ0ϕ
′
0 = Mϕ0ψ0 =Mϕ0∧ψ0 = Mψ0∧ϕ0 =Mψ0ϕ0 = Mψ0ψ
′
0 .9

We will now define the novel notion of boolean closure, and prove some lemmas for it.
These will play a role in proving the soundness of the axiomatization of the logic BAPAL,
later.
Definition 14 (Boolean closure) Given atoms P , consider P¨ = P∪{pϕ0 | ϕ0 ∈ Lpl(P )}.
The boolean closure of a model M = (S,∼, V ) for atoms P is the model M¨ = (S,∼, V¨ )
that is as M , except that the boolean closed valuation V¨ is for atoms P¨ and such that
V¨ (p) = V (p) for p ∈ P and V¨ (pϕ0) = [[ϕ0]]M for pϕ0 ∈ P¨ \ P . ⊣
As P is countably infinite, and as the booleans on P can be enumerated, P¨ is also countably
infinite. Given an epistemic model, then for each atom and for each boolean there are also
infinitely many atoms with the same value on the boolean closure of that model. E.g., p
has the same value as pp∧p (i.e., the atom q corresponding to the boolean p ∧ p), and the
same value as pp∧p∧p (the atom q
′ corresponding to boolean p ∧ p ∧ p), etc.
On a boolean closed model M¨ , for all booleans, including booleans of atoms in P¨ \ P ,
there is an atom with the same value, so that the semantics of ✷ becomes:
M¨s |= ✷ψ iff for all p ∈ P¨ : M¨s |= [p]ψ
The next lemma involves a translation tr : Lbapal (P¨ ) → Lbapal (P ) defined as tr(pϕ0) = ϕ0
for pϕ0 ∈ P¨ \ P and all other clauses trivial.
8Similar results for APAL were obtained in, e.g., [23]. What is crucial here is that on such models a
formula is satisfiable iff it is valid; the Ka and ✷ modalities then collapse: if ϕ is true, then it is known,
and remains so after update. The implicit quantification of ✷ over atoms not in the restriction has no
distinguishing power now.
9So, the proof of CR for BAPAL is easier than for other quantified epistemic logics, where we ‘close
the diamond at the bottom’: we then declare the values of all atoms, i.e., ϕ′0 = ψ
′
0 = δs(ϕ).
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Lemma 15 Let ψ ∈ Lbapal (P¨ ), model M = (S,∼, V ) for atoms P and s ∈ S be given.
Then:
M¨s |= ψ iff Ms |= tr(ψ). ⊣
Proof The proof is by induction on ψ. As in other proofs in our contribution, it is
important for the induction that the formula is declared before the model and the state in
which it is interpreted. The interesting cases are:
Case ψ = q:
If q ∈ P , then M¨s |= q iff Ms |= q. If q ∈ P¨ \ P (and such that q = pϕ0), then M¨s |= q iff
Ms |= ϕ0.
Case ψ = [ψ′]ψ′′:
M¨s |= [ψ
′]ψ′′
⇔
M¨s |= ψ
′ implies M¨ψ
′
s |= ψ
′′
⇔ IH, and the implied [[ψ′]]M¨ = [[tr(ψ
′)]]M
Ms |= tr(ψ
′) implies M
tr(ψ′)
s |= tr(ψ′′)
⇔
Ms |= [tr(ψ
′)]tr(ψ′′)
⇔
Ms |= tr([ψ
′]ψ′′)
Case ψ = ✷ψ′:
M¨s |= ✷ψ
′
⇔
for all q ∈ P¨ , M¨s |= [q]ψ
′
⇔
for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl(P ), M¨s |= [ϕ0]ψ
′
⇔
for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl(P ), M¨s |= ϕ0 implies M¨
ϕ0
s |= ψ
′
⇔ (∗) IH
for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl(P ),Ms |= ϕ0 implies M
ϕ0
s |= tr(ψ
′)
⇔
for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl(P ),Ms |= [ϕ0]tr(ψ
′)
⇔
Ms |= tr(✷ψ
′).
In step (*) we use that by induction, M¨s |= ϕ0 iff Ms |= ϕ0, where tr(ϕ0) = ϕ0; that
this also holds for all other t satisfying ϕ0 in M , from which follows [[ϕ0]]M¨ = [[ϕ0]]M ; we
then use induction for ψ′ on another model than M , where we note that that the boolean
closure of a model restriction is that restriction of the boolean closure of the model, so
that M¨ϕ0s |= ψ
′ iff Mϕ0s |= tr(ψ
′). 
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Corollary 16 Let ψ ∈ Lbapal (P ). Then M¨s |= ψ iff Ms |= ψ, because in that case tr(ψ) =
ψ.
The following result will be needed to show the soundness of a rule in the axiomatization
of BAPAL. As a similar result from the literature ([4, Prop. 3.7]) was later shown false,
we give the proof in full detail. An atom q is fresh in a formula ϕ containing it, if ϕ does
not contain another occurrence of q.
Lemma 17 Let ψ{♯} be a possibility form, and M = (S,∼, V ) an epistemic model. If
Ms |= ψ{✸ϕ} then M¨s |= ψ{〈p〉ϕ} for a fresh p ∈ P¨ . ⊣
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of possibility forms. It is slightly more
elegant to prove the Lemma as an equivalence than as an implication. The other direction
of the equivalence is the direct application of the semantics of ✷. Further note that in the
formulation of the Lemma the formula is declared prior to the model. Therefore, induction
hypotheses for a subformula apply to model restrictions.
Case ♯: Let Ms |= ✸ϕ. Then, there is a ϕ0 ∈ Lpl such that Ms |= 〈ϕ0〉ϕ. Therefore
M¨s |= 〈pϕ0〉ϕ. As pϕ0 ∈ P¨ \ P , pϕ0 is fresh. Note that it could have been that ϕ0 = p ∈ P ,
but even so the variable pp is then different from variable p with the same value.
Case ψ ∧ ψ′{♯}:
Ms |= ψ ∧ ψ
′{✸ϕ}
⇔
Ms |= ψ and Ms |= ψ
′{✸ϕ}
⇔ induction & Lemma 15
M¨s |= ψ and M¨s |= ψ
′{〈p〉ϕ}
⇔
M¨s |= ψ ∧ ψ
′{〈p〉ϕ}
Note that, as p is fresh in ψ′{〈p〉ϕ} and p ∈ P¨ \ P , p remains fresh in ψ ∧ ψ′{〈p〉ϕ}.
Case Kˆaψ
′{♯}:
Ms |= Kˆaψ
′{✸ϕ}
⇔
∃t ∼a s such that Mt |= ψ
′{✸ϕ}
⇔ induction
∃t ∼a s such that M¨t |= ψ
′{〈p〉ϕ}
⇔
M¨s |= Kˆaψ
′{〈p〉ϕ}
Case 〈ψ〉ψ′{♯}:
Ms |= 〈ψ〉ψ
′{✸ϕ}
⇔
Ms |= ψ and M
ψ
s |= ψ
′{✸ϕ}
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⇔ induction & Lemma 15
M¨s |= ψ and M¨
ψ
s |= ψ
′{〈p〉ϕ}
⇔
M¨s |= 〈ψ〉ψ
′{〈p〉ϕ}
Again, as p is fresh in ψ′{〈p〉ϕ} and p ∈ P¨ \ P , p remains fresh in 〈ψ〉ψ′{〈p〉ϕ}. Also
note that the induction for ψ′{♯} (for ψ′{✸ϕ}) applies to any model, so also to Mψs . 
Lemma 18 Let ϕ ∈ Lbapal (P ) and p ∈ var(ϕ), and let Ms be an epistemic model. If ϕ is
valid, then M¨s |= ϕ[q/p] for any q ∈ P¨ \ P . ⊣
Proof Let ϕ be a validity in BAPAL(P ). We first show that, if P ⊆ Q, then ϕ is a validity
in BAPAL(Q). It is more intuitive to show the contrapositive (where we replace ϕ by ¬ϕ):
if ϕ is satisfiable for BAPAL(Q), then ϕ is satisfiable for BAPAL(P ). In the context of this
proof (and only in the context of this proof), we do not only have to keep track explicitly of
the parameter set of propositional variables for which the logical language is defined, but
similarly of the set of propositional variables for which a model is defined. We therefore
resort to let Ms(Q) denote that model M is defined for variables Q. This also implies that,
given some Ms(P ), its boolean closure is M¨s(P¨ ).
We now first prove by induction on ϕ ∈ Lbapal (P ) that for all Ms(Q), Ms(Q) |= ϕ
implies Ms(P ) |= ϕ. The non-trivial cases are ϕ = 〈ϕ
′′〉ϕ′ and ϕ = ✸ϕ′.
Case ϕ = 〈ϕ′′〉ϕ′: Suppose Ms(Q) |= 〈ϕ
′′〉ϕ′. Then Ms(Q) |= ϕ
′′ and Mϕ
′′
s (Q) |= ϕ
′.
By induction, it follows that Ms(P ) |= ϕ
′′ and Mϕ
′′
s (P ) |= ϕ
′ (as usual, note that the
inductive hypothesis applies to any model Nt(Q), not merely toMs(Q); it therefore applies
to Nt =M
ϕ′′
s (Q)). Therefore Ms(Q) |= 〈ϕ
′′〉ϕ′.
Case ϕ = ✸ϕ′: Suppose Ms(Q) |= ✸ϕ
′. Then there is ψ0 ∈ Lpl(Q) such thatMs(Q) |=
〈ψ0〉ϕ
′, and therefore Ms(Q) |= ψ0 and M
ψ0
s (Q) |= ϕ
′. For any atom q ∈ var(ψ0) such that
q ∈ Q \ P , choose a fresh atom p′ ∈ P (fresh with respect to ψ0 and ϕ
′, and with respect
to prior choices of such atoms in var(ψ0)), and transform M into N = (S,∼, V
′) with
V ′(p′) = V (q) and V ′(q) = V (p′). Let ψ′0 ∈ Lpl(P ) be the result of all such substitutions.
It is clear that Ms(Q) |= ψ0 iff Ns(Q) |= ψ
′
0 and that [[ψ0]]M = [[ψ
′
0]]N . We also have
Mψ0s (Q) |= ϕ
′ iff N
ψ′0
s (Q) |= ϕ′, as the value of ϕ′ does not depend on swapping variables
not occurring in it.
By induction, and as ψ′0 ∈ Lbapal (P ), Ns(Q) |= ψ
′
0 implies Ns(P ) |= ψ
′
0. Also by
induction, N
ψ′0
s (Q) |= ϕ′ implies N
ψ′0
s (P ) |= ϕ′. From Ns(P ) |= ψ
′
0 and N
ψ′0
s (P ) |= ϕ′
follows Ns(P ) |= ✸ϕ
′. Now observe that Ns(P ) and Ms(P ) only differ in variables not
occurring in ✸ϕ′, so that Ns(P ) |= ✸ϕ
′ iff Ms(P ) |= ✸ϕ
′. Therefore, Ms(P ) |= ✸ϕ
′.
We can now quickly close the argument. Let ϕ be satisfiable for Q. Then there is
Ms(Q) such that Ms(Q) |= ϕ. Using the above, Ms(P ) |= ϕ. Therefore ϕ is satisfiable for
P .
This proves that, if ϕ is valid for P , and P ⊆ Q, then ϕ is valid for Q. We continue.
Clearly P ⊂ P¨ . So, if ϕ is a validity of BAPAL(P ), then ϕ is a validity of BAPAL(P¨ ).
We now use that, for any validity ϕ′′ in a logic BAPAL(P ′′), p′′ ∈ P ′′, and fresh q′′ ∈ P ′′,
ϕ[q′′/p′′] is also a BAPAL(P ′′) validity. Therefore, given that ϕ is a validity of BAPAL(P¨ )
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and a (obviously) fresh q ∈ P¨ \ P , also ϕ[q/p] is a validity of BAPAL(P¨ ). Here is it
important to observe that this is a validity for the epistemic model class for variables P¨ ,
it is not relative to boolean closed models. In other words, the value of q, if q = pϕ0, need
not be related to the boolean ϕ0. But, fortunately, a boolean closed model for P is, after
all, a model for P¨ . Therefore, also M¨s(P¨ ) |= ϕ[q/p], as required. 
3 Expressivity
Given two logics X and Y , with languages respectively LX and LY :
• X is at least as expressive as Y iff for all ϕ ∈ LY there is a semantically equivalent
ψ ∈ LX ;
• X and Y are equally expressive iff X is at least as expressive as Y , and Y is at least
as expressive as X ;
• X is (strictly) more expressive than Y iff X is at least as expressive as Y and Y is
not at least as expressive as X .
We show that BAPAL is more expressive than EL and that BAPAL is not as least as
expressive as two other logics with quantification over announcements: APAL, and group
announcement logic (GAL) [1]. It is not known if APAL and GAL are at least as expressive
as BAPAL.10
In the models depicted below we use the following visual conventions: the names of
states are replaced by the sets of atoms true in those states; the accessibility relations for the
two agents a, b are reflexively and symmetrically (and transitively) closed, in other words,
they partition the domain into equivalence classes; and the actual state (the designated
world) is underlined.
Proposition 19 BAPAL is more expressive than EL. ⊣
Proof To prove that BAPAL is more expressive than EL we first observe that Lel ⊆ Lbapal ,
so that BAPAL is at least as expressive as EL, and we then observe that the (standard)
proof that EL is not at least as expressive as APAL [4] can also be used to show that EL
is not at least as expressive as BAPAL.
We recall the proof in [4], wherein the formula ✸(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) is shown not to be
equivalent to an epistemic logical formula ψ as follows. There must be a propositional
variable q not occurring in ψ. Two models that are bisimilar except for q will either make
ψ true in both or false in both. On the other hand, ✸(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) may be true in
one and false in the other, as it quantifies over variable q as well. This quantification is
10To prove that, one would somehow have to show that the BAPAL-✷ in a given formula ✷ϕ can be
‘simulated’ by an APAL-✷ that is properly entrenched in preconditions and postconditions relative to ϕ,
thus providing an embedding of Lbapal into Lapal . This seems quite hard.
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implicit, as q 6∈ var(✸(Kap ∧¬KbKap). We can therefore easily make 〈q〉(Kap∧ ¬KbKap)
true in one and false in the other, as shown below for Ms and M
′
s′ .
As the announcement q witnessing the diamond is a boolean, this also proves the case
for BAPAL.
{p} {}
{p, q} {q}
Ms:
a {p, q} {}
{p, q} {q}
a
a
b b
M ′s′:

Proposition 20 BAPAL is not at least as expressive as APAL. ⊣
Proof Consider (again, but to other usage) Lapal formula ✸(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). Let us
suppose that there exists an equivalent Lbapal formula ψ. Given the modal depth d(ψ) of
ψ, consider two models Nt, Ot′, with a difference between them further away from the root
than d(ψ), ensuring that Nt↔
d(ψ)Ot′ .
Formally, Nt and Ot′ can be defined as follows. Model Nt has domain Z, equivalence
classes for relation ∼a consisting of pairs {2i, 2i+1} for i ∈ Z and for relation ∼b consisting
of pairs {2i−1, 2i} for i ∈ Z, and with V (p) =
⋃
i∈Z{4i−1, 4i}. The actual state t is state
0. Note that Ms↔Nt, where Ms is the model that was used in the previous proposition.
Model Ot′ is as model Nt (and with t
′ = 0), except that the domain is restricted to the
range i ≤ 4j, where j is the least positive integer for which d(ψ) < 4j (so, on the left
model O is infinite, on the right it ends in two p worlds). As the argument in the proof is
abstract (ψ is hypothetical) and only needs j to be in excess of d(ψ)
4
(we only need to refer
to formulas of modal depth larger than d(ψ)), the schematic visualization of these models
below, wherein we have abstracted from the names of states, suffices in the proof.
{p} {} {}{p}{}{} {p} {p}
a
Ms:
{p} {} {}{p}{}{} {p} {p}
a b a b
Nt:
{p} {} {}{p}{}{} {p} {p}
a b a b > d(ψ) b
Ot′ :
{p} {} {}{p}{}{} {p} {p}
a b
Oϕt′ :
We use Lemma 10 that n-bisimilarity implies n-logical equivalence: from Nt↔
d(ψ)Ot′
it follows that Nt ≡
d(ψ) Ot′ and thus, as the formula ψ itself has depth d(ψ), that Nt |= ψ
iff Ot′ |= ψ (i). On the other hand, Nt 6|= ✸(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) (obviously, consider the
bisimilar Ms) whereas Ot′ |= ✸(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). To prove the latter we observe that any
finite subset of the model O can be distinguished from its complement by a formula in the
logic (by ‘distinguished’ we mean that the formula is true in all the states of that subset
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and false in all other states of the domain of that model), where we use that any state
can be distinguished from all others by its distance to the rightmost terminal state, that is
distinguished by Kap.
11 In particular, there must therefore be a distinguishing formula ϕ
of a three-state subset of O such that Oϕ is as depicted. As Oϕt′ |= Kap ∧ ¬KbKap, we get
that Ot′ |= 〈ϕ〉(Kap∧¬KbKap), and thus Ot′ |= ✸(Kap∧¬KbKap). This is a contradiction
with (i). Therefore, no such ψ ∈ Lbapal exists. 
As a corollary of Proposition 20 we can very similarly show that BAPAL is not at least
as expressive as GAL, as in GAL we also quantify over announcements of arbitrarily large
modal depth.
4 Axiomatization
We now provide a sound and complete finitary axiomatisation for boolean arbitrary an-
nouncement logic.
Definition 21 (Axiomatization bapal) This is the axiomatization bapal of BAPAL.
P propositional tautologies K Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kaϕ→ Kaψ)
T Kaϕ→ ϕ 4 Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ
5 ¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ AP [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
AN [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ) AC [ϕ](ψ ∧ ψ′)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]ψ′)
AK [ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ka[ϕ]ψ) AA [ϕ][ψ]ψ
′ ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]ψ′
A✷ ✷ϕ→ [ψ0]ϕ where ψ0 ∈ Lpl MP ϕ and ϕ→ ψ imply ψ
NecK ϕ implies Kaϕ NecA ϕ implies [ψ]ϕ
R✷ ψ → [ϕ′][p]ϕ implies ψ → [ϕ′]✷ϕ where p fresh
⊣
The rules and axioms in bapal are as in the axiomatization of APAL, except for the axiom
A✷ and the derivation rule R✷. A formula ϕ is a theorem (notation ⊢ ϕ) if it belongs to
the least set of formulas containing all axioms and closed under the derivation rules.
The main interest of bapal is that it is finitary, unlike other known axiomatizations
for logics with quantification over announcements [4, 1, 14] (except for [6], see Footnote
2). Essential towards proving that result is Lemma 17, stating that every diamond ✸ in a
possibility form is witnessed by the announcement 〈p〉 of a fresh variable.12
11The rightmost state in O is distinguished by Kap. The state to its left (in the picture) is distinguished
by KˆbKap ∧ ¬Kap, and the state to the left of that by KˆaKˆbKap ∧ ¬(KˆbKap ∧ ¬Kap) ∧ ¬Kap. And so
on. To distinguish any finite subset in O from its complement, take the disjunction of the distinguishing
formulas of its members.
12A similar lemma and finitary axiomatization reported for APAL [4] are in fact incorrect, see
http://personal.us.es/hvd/errors.html, although for APAL the infinitary axiomatization stands
[4, 3, 5].
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To demonstrate soundness and completeness of the axiomatization bapal we can (still)
use the line of reasoning in [4].
We start with soundness. The soundness of axiom A✷ directly follows from the seman-
tics of ✷. To establish the soundness of rule R✷, consider three versions of this derivation
rule (let ψ(♯) be a necessity form).
• R✷ω: (ψ([ϕ0]ϕ) for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl) implies ψ(✷ϕ).
• R✷1: (ψ([p]ϕ) for a fresh p ∈ P ) implies ψ(✷ϕ).
• R✷: (ψ′ → [ϕ′][p]ϕ for a fresh p ∈ P ) implies ψ′ → [ϕ′]✷ϕ.
We can analogously consider three axiomatizations:
• bapalω = bapal −R✷+R✷ω
• bapal1 = bapal −R✷+R✷1
• bapal
We show that all three ofR✷ω,R✷1, andR✷ are sound, and that all three axiomatizations
are sound and complete. It is thus a matter of taste which one is preferred. Note that
bapal
ω is infinitary whereas bapal1 and bapal are finitary. Finitary axiomatizations
are considered preferable over infinitary axiomatizations. Both bapal1 and bapal have
(an instantiation of) a necessity form as premiss. The difference is that ψ′ → [ϕ′][p]ϕ is
a particular necessity form whereas ψ([p]ϕ) can be any necessity form. As R✷ is more
restrictive in logical structure, it may be considered preferable. Again, this is a matter of
taste.
The soundness of rule R✷ω directly follows from the semantics of ✷. We now show
that the derivation rule R✷1 is sound. This is the main technical result of this section,
wherein we use results for the boolean completion of models, introduced in Section 2.
Proposition 22 Derivation rule R✷1 is sound. ⊣
Proof We recall that for any ψ(ϕ′) ∈ Lbapal (where ψ(♯) is a necessity form), ψ{¬ϕ
′}
(where ψ′{♯} is a possibility form) is equivalent to ¬ψ(ϕ′) (Lemma 12).
Suppose that ψ([p]ϕ) ∈ Lbapal (P ) is valid where p is fresh. Let M be any epistemic
model. Then from Lemma 18 follows that M¨s |= ψ([q]ϕ) for any fresh atom q ∈ P¨ \ P .
Therefore it is not the case that: there is a q ∈ P¨ \ P such that M¨s |= ψ{〈q〉¬ϕ} where
q is fresh. By applying the contrapositive of Lemma 17, we obtain Ms 6|= ψ{✸¬ϕ}, i.e.,
Ms |= ψ(✷ϕ). 
Corollary 23 Derivation rule R✷ is sound. ⊣
Theorem 24 bapal is sound. ⊣
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We proceed to show that the three axiomatizations are complete, by way of showing
that they all define the same set of theorems.
Proposition 25 ([5]) bapalω is complete. ⊣
Proof The soundness of the infinitary axiomatization bapalω follows from the soundness
of the infinitary derivation rule R✷ω mentioned above. The completeness of bapalω is
shown exactly as in [5] (where we note that the proof in [5] is an improvement on the version
found in [4]): we only have to replace ‘epistemic’ by ‘boolean’ on some occasions. It is
therefore omitted.13 The completeness part involves a canonical model construction and
a fairly involved complexity measure and truth lemma with induction and subinduction
using that complexity. 
Lemma 26 ([4]) A derivation in bapal1 can be transformed into a derivation in bapal.⊣
Proof This proof is also found in [4], but we present it slightly differently.
A rule application of R✷1 in a derivation can be transformed into a rule application
of R✷ plus additional derivation steps. These additional steps simulate the semantical
equivalences used below.
Let a necessity form ϕ′′(♯) be given. Note that ♯ is always the final (rightmost) non-
auxiliary symbol in a necessity form (only parentheses ‘)’ may follow it). Consider a
formula ϕ′′([p]ϕ). We can transform/rewrite it into a formula of the required shape ψ′ →
[ϕ′][p]ϕ by using some (provable) equivalences of public announcement logic (see also the
proof of Lemma 11). All these equivalences preserve the property that the formula is an
instantiation of a necessity form. To avoid separate treatment of boundary cases, note that
ϕ′′([p]ϕ) is equivalent to ϕ′′(⊤ → [⊤][p]ϕ), and take the latter as the starting point of the
rewrite procedure. The equivalences are the following. Their possibly iterated application
13What exactly is ‘exactly’? As we omit the proof for that reason, we should maybe justify this in detail.
There are differences. The names of the axioms and rules in [5] are different from ours. For example, the
axiom Ka(ϕ → ψ) → (Kaϕ → Kaψ) that we call K, they call A1, etc. This is not a relevant difference.
Instead of the axiom A✷ and the rule R✷ω involving booleans, the system in [5] has an axiom and rule
involving epistemic formulas (but that are otherwise identical): an axiom “✷ϕ → [ψ]ϕ where ψ ∈ Lel”
and a rule “(ψ([ϕ′]ϕ for all ϕ′ ∈ Lel) implies ψ(✷ϕ)”. Whether this is a relevant difference depends on
their usage in the proof. Careful examination of the entire proof reveals about a dozen occurrences of the
word ‘epistemic’ that have to be replaced by the word ‘boolean’ while the same argument still holds: their
role is in all occasions that these formulas do not contain ✷ operators and thus have lower complexity,
which is required for inductive assumptions. This is a relevant difference. But it can be handled by
replacing ‘epistemic’ by ‘boolean’. (And that is all. This is surprisingly easy to handle.) We forget one
final difference: the system in in [5] contains an additional derivation rule “ϕ implies ✷ϕ”, that we do not
have. But it is derivable in [5]: let ϕ be given, then for all ψ we get, with NecA, [ψ]ϕ, so in particular we
get that for all epistemic ψ, from which with their version of R✷ω follows ✷ϕ, as required. So this is also
not a relevant difference.
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delivers the required form.
[ϕ′](ψ′ → ψ) ↔ [ϕ′]ψ′ → [ϕ′]ψ
[ϕ′]Kaψ ↔ ϕ
′ → Ka[ϕ
′]ψ
[ϕ′][ψ′]ψ ↔ [ϕ′ ∧ [ϕ′]ψ′]ψ
ϕ→ (ϕ′ → ψ) ↔ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)→ ψ
ϕ→ Kaψ ↔ Kˆaϕ→ ψ

With these results we can now easily demonstrate that not only bapalω but also the other
two axiomatizations are complete and define the same set of theorems. Below, let the name
of the axiomatization stand for the set of derivable theorems.
• bapalω ⊆ bapal1: A derivation with R✷ω rule applications (with, for each such
application, an infinite number of premisses, one for each boolean) can be transformed
into one with R✷1 rule applications by removing all but one premiss (namely, keep
one for a fresh boolean p) in each such R✷ω rule application.
• bapal1 = bapal: A derivation with R✷1 rule applications can be transformed
into one with R✷ rule applications by employing the (derivable) equivalences in the
transformation spelled out above (Lemma 11). The other direction (of the mutual
inclusion) is trivial, as a R✷ rule application is also a R✷1 rule application.
• bapal ⊆ bapalω: Here we use completeness of bapalω. Let a bapal theorem be
given. Using soundness of bapal, we obtain that it is valid. The completeness proof
of bapalω involves showing that every bapalω consistent formula is satisfiable. In
other words, all BAPAL validities are bapalω theorems. So, our bapal theorem,
that is a BAPAL validity, is a bapalω theorem.
Theorem 27 bapal is complete. ⊣
5 Decidability of the satisfiability problem
To show that BAPAL is decidable we give a procedure to find a finite model of any
satisfiable formula. The correctness of this procedure is shown by induction over the
depth of the nesting of the ✷ operator.
Given a formula ϕ ∈ Lbapal , we recall that D(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of ✷ operators
in ϕ, that d(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of Ka operators (for any a ∈ A) in ϕ, and that
var(ϕ) is the set of propositional variables that appear in ϕ.
Lemma 11 demonstrated that we may assume without loss of generality that any for-
mula ϕ is in arbitrary announcement normal form (ϕ ∈ Laanf ), and consequently that all
✷ operators are necessarily coupled with a single public announcement operator, and vice
versa. This assumption will now be made throughout this section. This means that D(ϕ)
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now not only determines the number of ✷ modalities in ϕ, but also the (same) number of
announcements. Let ψ ⊆ ϕ denote that ψ is a subformula of ϕ in Laanf syntax (so that
the subformulas of [ϕ′]✷ϕ exclude ✷ϕ) and let |ϕ| denote the number of symbols in ϕ. In
this section, apart from ϕ, ψ we also allow α (possibly primed) to be a formula variable.
To model arbitrary boolean announcements we introduce a set of fresh atoms to repre-
sent all the announcements that can be made within a model (by way of associating a set
of formulas to a state, such that a subset of the domain will correspond to a set of sets of
formulas). These fresh atoms are with respect to a given formula ϕ.
Definition 28 (Closure)
1. Given ϕ ∈ Laanf , we define cl(ϕ), the closure of ϕ, inductively so that:
• cl(ϕ) = {ψ,¬ψ | ψ ⊆ ϕ} if d(ϕ) = 0, and
• cl(ϕ) = {ψ,¬ψ | ψ ⊆ ϕ}∪{Kaψ
′,¬Kaψ
′ | Kaψ ⊆ ϕ and ψ
′ ∈ cl(ψ)} if d(ϕ) > 0.
Note that in the second clause d(ψ) < d(ϕ), so the definition is well-founded.
2. Let the extended closure of ϕ be cl∗(ϕ) := cl(ϕ)∪fresh(ϕ), where fresh(ϕ) = {pk | k ≤
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(|ϕ|·4|ϕ|)
} are fresh atoms (we recall that pk is fresh if pk /∈ var(ϕ)). ⊣
The variables in var(ϕ) ∪ fresh(ϕ) are also denoted as var∗(ϕ) (so that var(cl∗(ϕ)) =
var∗(ϕ)). Finally, let for all x ≥ 0 the x-closure set of ϕ be clx(ϕ) = {ψ ∈ cl(ϕ)| D(ψ) ≤
x}.
As the atoms of fresh(ϕ) are intended to label subsets of subsets of cl(ϕ), i.e, elements
of ℘(℘(cl(ϕ))), we first show that |cl(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|.4|ϕ|, so that we have sufficient labels.
Lemma 29 |cl(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|.4|ϕ|. ⊣
Proof To see this, we consider what the elements of cl(ϕ) look like. They are either a
subformula of ϕ or a negation of a subformula of ϕ (from the first clause of Definition 28),
or they are a subformula of ϕ prefixed by a series of knowledge operators and negations.
Specifically if ϕ has the form14
ϕ(Kj1ϕ1(Kj2ϕ2(. . . (Kjkψ))))
where each jk corresponds to some (not necessarily unique) agent, then the instances of ψ
appearing in cl(ϕ) will be ◦0 ⋆1 ◦1 . . . ⋆k ◦kψ where ◦ℓ is either ¬ or nothing, and ⋆ℓ is either
Kjℓ or nothing. As k < |ϕ|, (there must be at least one atom), and for each ℓ ≤ k there
are four possiblilities for the values of ◦ℓ and ⋆ℓ, for each subformula, there are less than
4|ϕ| variations of each subformula of ϕ in the set cl(ϕ). As there are |ϕ| subformulas of ϕ,
our upper bound is |ϕ|·4|ϕ|. 
14Where ϕ1(ϕ2) denotes that ϕ2 is a subformula of ϕ1, and not an instantiation of a necessity form.
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Example 30 Consider ϕ = p→ KaKb[q]✷r ∈ Laanf . Then, for example, cl(ϕ) contains
¬KaKbr but does not contain ¬KbKar, as the formulas in cl(ϕ) of type Kbψ must be such
that the constituents of ψ that are not negation symbols are part of the subformula bound
by Kb in ϕ, which excludes Ka. For the same reason, Kap 6∈ cl(ϕ). Further, for example,
✷r,Ka✷r 6∈ cl(ϕ): only formulas in announcement normal form occur in the closure. We
recall that for the convenience of this section the inductive structure of formulas is Laanf ;
this rules out that ✷r is a subformula of [q]✷r). ⊣
Definition 31 Given ϕ ∈ Laanf , a maximal ϕ-set is a set σ ⊆ cl
∗(ϕ) such that:
1. for all ¬ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), either ψ ∈ σ or ¬ψ ∈ σ.
2. for all ψ ∧ ψ′ ∈ cl(ϕ), ψ ∧ ψ′ ∈ σ iff ψ ∈ σ and ψ′ ∈ σ.
3. for all Kaψ ∈ cl(ϕ), Kaψ ∈ σ implies ψ ∈ σ.
The set of maximal ϕ-sets is denoted Σ. ⊣
Apart from σ, variables for maximal ϕ-sets are τ, ρ (possibly primed). We note that, apart
from the closure conditions that apply to the members from cl(ϕ) as part of cl∗(ϕ), a
maximal ϕ-set may contain an arbitrary subset of atoms from fresh(ϕ) as part of cl∗(ϕ).
We now take the maximal ϕ-sets as the worlds of a model. The intention is that every
satisfiable formula in cl(ϕ) should be satisfied by some such model.
Definition 32 Given ϕ ∈ Laanf , a ϕ-closure model is a M = (S
M ,∼M , V M) such that:
1. SM ⊆ Σ;
2. for σ, τ ∈ SM , σ ∼Ma τ iff for all Kaψ ∈ cl(ϕ), Kaψ ∈ σ iff Kaψ ∈ τ ;
3. for all σ ∈ SM , for all ¬Kaψ ∈ σ, there is some τ ∈ S
M where τ ∼Ma σ and ¬ψ ∈ τ ;
4. for all p ∈ var∗(ϕ), for all σ ∈ SM , σ ∈ V M(p) iff p ∈ σ; for all p 6∈ var ∗(ϕ),
V M(p) = ∅.
Let Γ0(ϕ) be the set of all ϕ-closure models. ⊣
Definition 32 is a standard bottom-up tableau construction for showing decidability in
modal logic. In order for the definition to be consistent with the announcement operator
we refine the set of ϕ-closure models inductively with respect to the depth of nestings of
announcement operators in ϕ. As ϕ is in announcement normal form, this is the same as
the depth D(ϕ) of ✷-operators.
Definition 33 Given ϕ ∈ Laanf , and some x where 0 ≤ x ≤ D(ϕ), an x-ϕ-closure model
is a ϕ-closure model M = (SM ,∼M , V M) where:
1. if x = 0, then M ∈ Γ0(ϕ); and
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2. if x > 0, then for all [α]✷ψ ∈ clx(ϕ), for all σ ∈ S
M , [α]✷ψ ∈ σ iff for all ψ0 ∈
Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)) such that Mσ |= ψ0, for all (x − 1)-ϕ-closure models N and τ ∈ S
N
such that Nτ↔M
αψ0
σ , we have ψ ∈ τ ;
For the set of x-ϕ-closure models we write Γx(ϕ), noting that this is consistent with Defi-
nition 32. ⊣
For the definition of model restriction Mαψ0 , above, we refer the reader to Definition 7.
We note that as for all x < D(ϕ), clx(ϕ) ⊂ clx+1(ϕ), it follows that for all x < D(ϕ),
Γx+1(ϕ) ⊆ Γx(ϕ), since Γx+1(ϕ) has at least as many constraints as Γx(ϕ).
Let us now denote by C(ϕ) the set ΓD(ϕ)(ϕ). We also note that:
Lemma 34 On any ϕ-closure modelMs: Ms |= ✷ϕ iffMs |= [ψ0]ϕ for all ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)).⊣
Proof The variables not in var∗(ϕ) have empty denotation — see clause 3. of Definition
32. Therefore a quantification over all booleans in P is a quantification over all booleans
in var∗(ϕ). 
We project models into the set C(ϕ) with the following transformation.
Definition 35 Let ϕ ∈ Laanf . Given some model M = (S
M ,∼M , V M), then for all u ∈
SM , let uϕ = {ψ′ ∈ cl(ϕ) | Mu |= ψ
′}, and for all T ⊆ SM , let T ϕ = {sϕ | s ∈ T}. Suppose
also that the subsets of ℘(cl(ϕ)) are enumerated as Φ0, . . . ,Φk.
15 For each s ∈ SM , let
s ∈ Σ be such that
s = sϕ ∪ {pk | pk ∈ fresh(ϕ) and there is p ∈ P such that s ∈ V
M(p) and V M(p)ϕ = Φk}
Then, the ϕ-projection of M is the model M where:
1. SM = {s | s ∈ SM};
2. for all σ, τ ∈ SM and a ∈ A, σ ∼Ma τ iff for some s, t ∈ S
M , s ∼Ma t, s = σ and
t = τ ;
3. for all p ∈ P and σ ∈ SN , σ ∈ V M(p) iff p ∈ σ. ⊣
In the above definition, the remaining fresh variables pk such that for all p ∈ P and
s ∈ V M(p), V M(p)ϕ 6= Φk will therefore get empty denotation; and the atoms p 6∈ fresh(ϕ)
will also get empty denotation. Both are covered by clause 3.
The critical part of this definition is that in a given model, any atom p (of countably
infinitely many) with non-empty denotation on its domain corresponding to that of a set Φk
of sets of formulas in the closure of ϕ,16 is witnessed by a fresh variable pk (of finitely many).
Obviously, any boolean worth considering when interpreting the boolean quantifier ✷ on
this domain will consist of atoms with non-empty denotation. Consequently, any boolean
in Lpl(P ) will have the same denotation on M as a boolean in Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)).
Our approach now is to show that:
15 Where we note that k ≤ |fresh(ϕ)|. We recall that the cardinality of fresh(ϕ) is a rough upper bound
on the number of such subsets.
16This is the denotation of the disjunction for all Φ′k ∈ Φk of the conjunctions for all ϕ
′
k ∈ Φ
′
k.
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1. The ϕ-projection preserves the interpretation of formulas from cl(ϕ).
2. For every model M , M ∈ C(ϕ).
We first show that the ϕ-projection preserves the interpretation of formulas.
Lemma 36 For all ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), for all models M , for all s ∈ SM ,
Ms |= ψ iff M s |= ψ.
Proof We can proceed by induction over the complexity of ψ.
• For ψ = p ∈ var(ϕ), Ms |= p iff p ∈ s, iff s ∈ V
M(p), iff M s |= p.
• For ψ = ψ′ ∧ ψ′′, Ms |= ψ iff Ms |= ψ
′ and Ms |= ψ
′′. By the induction hypothesis,
Ms |= ψ
′ iff M s |= ψ
′, and likewise for ψ′′. Therefore, Ms |= ψ
′∧ψ′′ iff M s |= ψ
′∧ψ′′.
• For ψ = ¬ψ′, Ms |= ¬ψ
′ iff Ms 6|= ψ
′, iff Ms 6|= ψ
′ (by the induction hypothesis), iff
M s |= ¬ψ
′.
• For ψ = Kaψ
′, suppose Ms |= Kaψ
′. For each τ ∈ SM , where s ∼a τ , there is some
pair s′, t′ ∈ SM such that s′ ∼a t
′, s′ = s and t′ = τ . Therefore, as Ms |= Kaψ
′, we
have Kaψ
′ ∈ s = s′ (Def. 32), so Ms′ |= Kaψ
′, and for all such t′ we have Mt′ |= ψ
′.
By the induction hypothesis we have M t′ |= ψ
′, i.e., M τ |= ψ
′. We now have that for
all τ ∈ SM , if s ∼Ma τ then M τ |= ψ
′. Hence M s |= Kaψ
′.
Conversely, suppose that M s |= Kaψ
′. Then for every t ∈ SM where t ∼Ma s we have
t ∼M s. As M s |= Kaψ
′, it follows that M t |= ψ
′, and by the induction hypothesis,
Mt |= ψ
′. As this holds for all t where s ∼Ma t, we have Ms |= Kaψ
′.
• For ψ = [α]✷ψ′, if Ms 6|= α then the results follows immediately from the induction
hypothesis. Where Ms |= α we observe the following equivalences:
Ms |= [α]✷ψ
′ ⇐⇒ Mαs |= ✷ψ
′
⇐⇒ ∀ϕ0 ∈ Lpl ,M
α
s |= [ϕ0]ψ
′
⇐⇒ ∀ϕ0 ∈ Lpl ,M
α
s |= ϕ0 implies M
αϕ0
s |= ψ
′
⇐⇒ (IH) ∀ϕ0 ∈ Lpl ,Mαs |= ϕ0 implies Mαϕ0s |= ψ
′
Here we can see that for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , for every atom p appearing in ϕ0 there is some
Φk = V
M(p)ϕ, so that p is witnessed by pk ∈ fresh(ϕ). Therefore, for all p 6∈ var
∗(ϕ)
there is p′ ∈ var∗(ϕ) with the same denotation on M as p. And therefore, there
is some ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)) such that Mαϕ0 = Mα
ψ0
. By the induction hypothesis,
we have Mα = M
α
, since M and M agree on the interpretation of α (and not
only in states s and s, but also in any state t or t of the denotation of α). So it
follows that for all ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , there is some ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)) where Mαϕ0 = M
αψ0
.
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Likewise, for every ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)), there is some ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , namely ϕ0 = ψ0, where
Mαϕ0 = M
αψ0
, and so:
∀ϕ0 ∈ Lpl , Mαϕ0s |= ψ
′ ⇐⇒ ∀ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)), M
αψ0
s |= ψ
′.
Continuing:
∀ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)), M
αψ0
s |= ψ
′
(Lemma 34) ⇐⇒ M
α
s |= ✷ψ
′
⇐⇒ Ms |= [α]✷ψ
′

We now show that the image of the ϕ-projection must be in the set of ϕ-closure models.
Lemma 37 For every model M , M ∈ C(ϕ). ⊣
Proof To show M ∈ C(ϕ), we first show that M is a ϕ-closure model (Definition 32). Let
M = (SM ,∼M , V M). We consider the clauses of Definition 32 in turn:
1. For s ∈ SM , s ⊆ cl∗(ϕ), so SM ⊆ Σ.
2. From Definition 35 for all σ, τ ∈ SM where σ ∼a τ we have some s, t ∈ S
M where
s ∼Ma t, s = σ and t = τ . Then Kaψ ∈ σ∩cl(ϕ) if and only Ms |= Kaψ iff Mt |= Kaψ
iff Kaψ ∈ τ ∩ cl(ϕ).
3. For all p ∈ cl∗(ϕ), for all σ ∈ SM , σ ∈ V M if and only p ∈ σ. This is guaranteed by
clause 3 of Definition 35.
4. Suppose ¬Kaψ ∈ σ ∈ S
M . Therefore there is some s ∈ SM where s = σ, so
Ms |= ¬Kaψ. It follows that there is some t ∈ S
M where t ∼a s and Mt |= ¬ψ. From
Definition 35, there is τ ∈ SM where σ ∼a τ and t = τ , so ¬ψ ∈ τ .
Therefore M is a ϕ-closure model.
We now must show that for every x ≤ D(ϕ),M is an x-ϕ-closure model (Definition 33).
That is, there is a witness for every quantified formula. The proof is by induction on the
quantifier depth D(ψ) of formulas ψ ∈ cl(ϕ). As the base case of this induction, it is
enough to note that every ϕ-closure model is a 0-ϕ-closure model. Now, suppose we have
for all M , M is an x-ϕ-closure model (so M in Γx(ϕ)).
We show that
For all σ ∈ SM and [α]✷ψ ∈ clx+1(ϕ):
[α]✷ψ ∈ σ iff (for every ψ0 ∈ Lpl (var
∗(ϕ)) where Mσ |= ψ0, for all N ∈ Γx(ϕ),
for all τ ∈ SN where Nτ↔M
αψ0
σ : ψ ∈ τ).
24
Suppose, [α]✷ψ ∈ σ. From this assumption it follows that there is some s ∈ SM where
s = σ and Ms |= [α]✷ψ. If Ms 6|= α, then the clause is vacuously true, since by Lemma 36,
Mσ 6|= α, so there is no pointed model M
αψ0
s . Now suppose for contradiction, there is some
ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)) such that for some N ∈ Γx(ϕ), for some τ ∈ S
N , Nτ↔M
αψ0
σ and ψ /∈ τ .
From Lemma 36, we have Nτ |= ¬ψ. As Lbapal is bisimulation invariant (Lemma 8) we have
M
αψ0
σ |= ¬ψ. From the argument presented in Lemma 36, there is some ϕ0 ∈ Lpl such that
Mαϕ0σ |= ¬ψ. Therefore, there is some s ∈ S
M where Ms |= 〈α〉✸¬ψ, i.e., Ms 6|= [α]✷ψ,
and s = σ. From the maximality of σ (for all ¬ϕ in the closure, either ϕ or ¬ϕ is in σ) it
follows that [α]✷ψ /∈ σ, giving the required contradiction.
Conversely, suppose for every ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)) where σ |= ψ0, for all N ∈ Γx(ϕ),
for all τ ∈ SN where Nτ↔M
αψ0
σ , we have ψ ∈ τ . By the induction hypothesis we have
Nτ |= ψ and hence for every ψ0 ∈ Lpl(var
∗(ϕ)), M
αψ0
σ |= ψ. Therefore Mσ |= [α]✷ψ, and
[α]✷ψ ∈ σ from Lemma 36. 
We can now put everything together.
Corollary 38 For all ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), ψ is satisfiable iff there is some M ∈ C(ϕ) such that for
some σ ∈ SM , ψ ∈ σ. ⊣
Proof In the forward direction, if ψ is satisfiable then for some model N , for some t ∈ SN ,
we have Nt |= ψ. Therefore, by Lemma 36 we have N t |= ψ, by Definition 35 we have
ψ ∈ t, and by Lemma 37 we have N ∈ C(ϕ).
Conversely, if ψ ∈ σ, then by Definition 35, for some s ∈ SM , we have Ms |= ψ. 
As the set C(ϕ) is finite, and contains models of a bounded size, we have established a
bounded model property. The model-checking procedure for finite models is effectively a
direct application of Definition 7, and together with the bounded model checking problem
gives the decidability of the satisfiability problem for BAPAL.
The satisfiability procedure now runs as follows:
1. We build C(ϕ), by applying a top-down tableaux approach. From Lemma 29, the
size of C(ϕ) is O(22
2(|ϕ|·4
|ϕ|)
). We can enumerate these models, and build C(ϕ) by
computing M for each such model using a model-checking procedure.
2. We report that ϕ is satisfiable iff ϕ appears in σ for some σ ∈ SM ∈ C(ϕ).
The size of C(ϕ) dominates the decision procedure so the time required is 4EXP in the
size of ϕ.
As the set C(ϕ) is finite, we can from that also conclude, with Corollary 38, that:
Theorem 39 The logic BAPAL is decidable. ⊣
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6 Conclusions and further research
We proposed the logic BAPAL. It is an extension of public announcement logic. It contains
a modality ✷ϕ intuitively corresponding to: “after every public announcement of a boolean
formula, ϕ is true.” We have shown that the logic BAPAL is more expressive than multi-
agent epistemic logic, that it has a finitary axiomatization, and — our main result — that
its satisfiability problem is decidable.
For further research we reserve the investigation of yet another logic with quantification
over announcements, called positive arbitrary public announcement logic, APAL+. It has
a primitive modality “after every public announcement of a positive formula, ϕ is true.”
The positive formulas correspond to the universal fragment in first-order logic. These are
the formulas where negations do not bind modalities. We conjecture that this logic is also
decidable, like BAPAL. It has been tentatively reported in [21].
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